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wards, but also given rise to increased interest about the Rus-
sian drive to establish itself as an increasingly Asia-oriented 
‘Euro-Pacific’ power. An important factor in shaping any 
pivot strategy is how it is perceived by the countries towards 
which the pivot is sought. China’s new role as an increas-
ingly important political partner and economic linchpin for a 
more Asia-oriented Russia harbours both opportunities and 
challenges for the Chinese side, in the latest chapter of an 
often conflicted historical relationship. The Chinese under-
standing of the character and potential of Russia’s ‘Go East’ 
strategy is set to have notable impact on both the outcomes 
of Russia’s regional development plans, and the broader eco-
nomic and geopolitical environment in Eurasia. 
The Uneasy History of Sino-Russian Relations 
Russia is arguably the European country that has influenced 
China the most. As the pioneer of the Communist system, the 
impact of Russia has been profound on the Chinese societal, 
economic and political models. The Sino-Russian relation-
ship has, however, been anything but a stable partnership, in 
spite of the related nature of the two countries’ path to moder-
nity. During the initial years of the Cold War the cooperation 
between the two giant countries of the Eurasian landmass 
was of grave concern to the Western camp, particularly in the 
aftermath of the Korean War. However, as a set of political and 
ideological disputes lead to the famous Sino-Soviet split in 
the 1960s, the relationship turned into open hostility, involv-
ing border clashes, and such strong fears of an imminent 
nuclear strike that the Chinese leadership at one point felt 
compelled to decamp from Beijing. The otherwise eventful 
year of 1989 was also remarkable in that it witnessed Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s Beijing visit. This was the first summit between 
the countries in three decades, and symbolized a sea-change 
in the cooperation between the parties. Over the next dec-
ade, the relationship continued to be limited in economic 
terms, although Russia found China a useful partner during 
downturns in their relationship with the West. Moscow and 
Beijing would in 1996 sign documents establishing a ‘strate-
gic partnership’ between them. As Putin entered office in the 
year 2000, he built relations first with Chinese leader Jiang 
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The relationship between China and Russia is again mak-
ing international headlines, as China and the Asia-Pacific 
region have become central in a new Russian strategy to 
establish Moscow as a ‘Euro-Pacific Power’. This new mo-
mentum on the Eurasian continent, given impetus by the 
Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions against Russia, plays 
into Chinese hands an opportunity to further strengthen 
the historically significant Sino-Russian relationship. Nev-
ertheless, even though the Chinese political elite is wel-
coming the economic dimensions of Russia’s ‘rebalance’ 
as an opportunity to strengthen their own development 
strategies in the region, Beijing appears ambivalent to 
prospects of further alignment in international politics. Al-
though internal Chinese debate on the issue can be traced, 
the stated views of the Chinese foreign policy elite are 
suggesting a policy of maximising China’s economic gains 
from Russia’s ‘Go East’ strategy, while seeking to avoid too 
strong political ties which might engender risks for China’s 
relations to its main markets in the US and Europe. 
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Introduction
Russia’s ‘Go East’ strategy, a rebalancing of the Russian 
posture on the Eurasian continent, has been spurred on by 
the recent conflicts with Europe and the United States over 
the situation in Ukraine. The Russian initiative comes at a 
point when relations between Beijing and Moscow are at a 
historical high, and both in political and economic terms this 
latest chapter in the volatile Sino-Russian relationship car-
ries significant potential for altering the political realities of 
Norway’s largest neighbour. China and the Asia-Pacific are at 
the centre of a global redistribution of economic and politi-
cal clout. Accordingly, the region has over the last couple of
years been the focal point of a set of ‘Eastern strategies’ from 
other core members of the international system. Russia’s in-
tention to pivot to the Asia-Pacific has, for some time, been 
an effort undertaken in relative obscurity, as the overwhelm-
ing majority of global attention has been allotted to the 
Obama administration’s ‘Pacific Pivot’. However, the Ukraine 
crisis has spurred on not only Russian efforts to turn east-
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Zemin and then his successor Hu Jintao, and the Sino-Rus-
sian relationship saw considerable development in the new 
millennium. Most notably, under the Hu-Putin leadership 
a final agreement on the demarcation of the two countries’ 
common border was achieved in 2005, with the last details 
solved in 2008. Simultaneously, the tension over the issue 
of immigration from China’s Northern provinces in the Far 
East was reduced, in another act conductive to the “Treaty 
of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation” signed 
in 2001. From 2003 onwards Putin would increasingly seek 
to strengthen the relationship with China, the newly estab-
lished Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) becoming 
an increasingly important forum. Simultaneously, the bilat-
eral trade between the countries would see a steady growth, 
increasing with as much as 44,3% in 2007 to a grand total 
of US$48,17 billion. Much of this rapid growth in trade value 
came, however, as a consequence of the rapidly rising prices 
of hydrocarbons, Russia’s main export to China. The trade 
relationship between the parties is furthermore still dwarfed 
by China’s total trade with the US, at US$562 billion in 2013.
In recent years, a number of common interests have driven the 
development of the Sino-Russian relationship. Both parties 
share the wish for domestic stability and economic develop-
ment, a goal that for China’s part is made more attainable with 
the input Russia can provide of energy, raw materials and arms. 
The shared concern that Islamic extremism and insurgency in 
Central Asia since the 1990s might spill over into their respec-
tive border provinces, has also been a driver for cooperation, 
particularly within the context of the SCO. Simultaneously, 
Russia has been regarded as an important ally for the stated 
Chinese wish to achieve a ‘more democratic world order’, 
by standing up to US unilateralism and perceived Western 
attempts to undermine the countries by fermenting political 
protests. As such, it was both symbolic, and hardly surprising, 
that Xi Jinping’s first official state visit was to Moscow. China 
and Russia have now established regular summits, and the 
range of exchange mechanisms between the two countries is 
on a wider level than China has with any other country, while 
the flow of trade in weapon systems and joint military exer-
cises adds yet another dimension to the partnership. In spite of 
the discomfort with which China regarded Russia’s policies in 
Ukraine, Beijing would, instead of joining in on the sanctions 
regime, sign a landmark long-term US$ 400 billion gas agree-
ment with Russia in May 2014. Such actions are paired with 
the continuation of increased Sino-Russian coordination
in multilateral fora such as the UN, and in an increasingly 
proactive common stance in the BRICS group. In addition the 
countries have been cooperating in creating institutions such 
as the New Development Bank which offer alternatives to the 
economic support and regional public goods provided by 
Western controlled institutions. In a high-profile 2014 inter-
view with Rossiya TV during his Sochi Olympics visit, Xi Jin-
ping would hail Sino-Russian relations as having reached “the 
most solid foundation, the highest level of mutual trust and 
the greatest regional and global influence ever.”1 The Xi-Putin 
era, the latest chapter of a long and volatile relationship, has 
recently seen the advent of a Russian initiative with the stated 
potential to alter the relation between the countries, as well as 
the wider geopolitical environment of Eurasia; namely the Rus-
sian ‘Go East’ strategy.
Russia’s Turn to the East
In his 2013 state-of-the-nation address, Vladimir Putin 
declared that the development of Siberia and the Far East 
would be, after a long period of neglect, Russia’s national 
priority for the entire 21st century. Based on the realization 
of the growing economic dynamic of the Asia-Pacific region, 
calls for Russia to focus more attention on the Eastern part of 
its continent-spanning landmass had for a time been heard 
from academic and policy circles. Spurred on by Western sanc-
tions, and Russian concerns about the possibilities of a new 
Cold War with the West limiting access to important economic 
resources, the importance of developing economic and politi-
cal ties with the Asia-Pacific became an urgent priority. The 
challenges of an economic rebalance are, however, illustrated 
by the scale of Russia’s current dependence on the European 
markets, total trade with the European Union in 2012 reached 
267,5 billion euro, while its bilateral trade with China, as its 
second-largest trading partner, stood at a comparatively low 
EUR 64 billion. These deeply rooted economic structures are 
neither easily, nor quickly, altered. Nevertheless, the current 
political crisis between Russia and Europe have changed the 
political realities of Russia, and driven them to more urgently 
seek to embrace their south-eastern neighbour, with a central 
goal being to expand Sino-Russian trade to US$100 billion 
in 2015. Moscow is currently enacting a range of investment 
plans and political strategies aimed at stimulating the econ-
omy and building infrastructure in Siberia and the Far Eastern 
Federal District, tying the Western part of Russia closer to 
the Asia-Pacific through its Eastern regions. Simultaneously, 
closer political cooperation with Beijing is sought in regional 
and international fora. While the American ‘pivot’ lends itself 
easier to be considered as competing with Beijing, the Russian 
pivot eastwards is implicitly based on cooperation with Bei-
jing. It is however, important to take note of the Russian efforts 
to balance their relations with a range of East-Asian countries 
to avoid becoming too dependent on China. Russia’s neutrality 
on a range of Chinese territorial neighbour-disputes demon-
strates this approach, and highlights some of the limitations of 
the bilateral relationship. The question is how this new strat-
egy of pivoting eastwards, and the increased Russian need and 
wish for a closer relationship, is perceived from Beijing?
Views from the Pivot Point
Despite a history that has at times seen a lot of tension, the 
current Chinese public opinion of Russia is of a very positive 
hue. The Chinese public is furthermore singular amongst 
global opinion in that their view on Russia has become sig-
nificantly more positive during last year. While 35% of the 
Chinese sample would report unfavourable views of Russia 
in 2013, in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis only 23% of 
1 Xinhua, “Xi Hails Development of China-Russia Ties,” Febru-
ary 9, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-
02/09/c_133100705.htm; Sheng Zhong, “为发展中俄关系注入新动
力 (To Infuse the Development of Sino-Russian Relations With New 
Strength),” People’s Daily (Chinese Edition), January 27, 2014, http://
opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/0127/c1003-24238089.html.
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the Chinese public opinion was negative, while approval rates 
leapt to 66%.2 As such, the Chinese leadership could be con-
fident, as Xi Jinping recently remarked to Putin,3 in the public 
backing for embracing Russia more closely. Nevertheless, 
given the nature of the Chinese regime, the public opinion is 
a far less potent signifier of policy than are statements from 
the upper echelons of the government. Based on Chinese 
leaders’ speeches, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
and Ministry of National Defence (MoD) communications, as 
well as relevant media editorials, from the beginning of Xi’s 
leadership in 2012 throughout the Ukraine crisis till today, the 
view of the Chinese leadership on Russia’s ‘Go East’ strategy 
can broadly be subdivided into two main strands: One strand 
regards China’s support for the economic aspects of Russia’s 
rebalance. Another main strand concerns the political and 
military dimensions implicit to the Russian strategy.   
Regarding the economic aspects of Russia’s ‘Go East’ strategy, 
the official attitude has been one of welcoming it as a contri-
bution to the recent Chinese efforts to launch a grand scale 
developing project, seeking to bind Western China closer to 
Europe through the creation of a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ 
(绸之路经济带) crossing Central Asia. Tellingly, the public 
launch of Beijing’s New Silk Road initiative by an extensive 
webpage, originally showcased an interactive map that drew 
the New Silk Road directly to Europe by Istanbul, whereas the 
same official map would later change to suddenly also include
Moscow en route. In the words of Xi Jinping during his Sochi 
visit; “China welcomes Russia to participate in the construc-
tion of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk 
Road”.4 In editorials written by the CCP mouthpiece People’s 
Daily under the alias ‘Zhong Sheng’ (钟声), being a homo-
phone for ‘Voice of the Central’, and regarded as conveying 
official views of the Chinese government5, the invitation to the 
Russians to join in building the silk road economic belt “hand 
in hand” with the Chinese, is reiterated as one of the main pil-
lars of the relationship.6 This attitude is further underscored 
by, for example, Premiers Dmitry Medvedev and Li Keqiang, 
as they met in mid-December this year. Li explicitly declared 
China’s willingness to contribute to the development of Rus-
sia’s Far East in cooperation with the Russians, as well as 
pointing out the potential gains to be made as cooperation 
is intensified on areas such as high speed rail infrastructure, 
energy and raw materials. 7
In terms of the political dimensions, and the internationally 
much-hyped prospect of a closer alliance-style relationship 
between the parties, the tone is slightly more restrained, and 
there are more differing views to be heard. China’s official 
stance towards the Ukraine crisis is namely “it’s compli-
cated”8, neither giving full support nor condemning Russia on 
their actions, on what is for domestic reasons a contentious 
issue in China. The Global Times, having earlier argued that 
US encroachment of Eurasia on both fronts would lead to a 
Sino-Russian alliance9, was in March 2014 voicing an asser-
tive stance of Chinese support for Russia: “Russia’s resistance 
against the West has global significance. Supporting Russia 
consolidates China’s major strategy (…) This way, we will 
make more friends.”10 It is however important to note that the 
English language Global Times is considered a mouthpiece for 
the most conservative part of the Communist party. As such, 
their editorials can hardly be seen as authoritative for Chinese 
foreign policies, but nevertheless serves to show that there 
are differing views amongst the higher ranks of the CCP about 
Russia’s current and future role in Chinese foreign policy. The 
authoritative Chinese outlets have expressed a more cautious 
approach. Although a spokesperson for the Chinese MFA 
would in May 2014 underscore the need for closer Sino-Rus-
sian ties as a “necessary choice in the pursuit of global multi-
polarization”11, the MFA also takes care to reiterate that no 
such thing as an alliance between the countries would happen. 
The Sino-Russian ties are instead framed as an example of the 
“new style of great power relations” (新型大国关系) based on 
mutual interests and not directed against anyone. Interestingly, 
as the year 2014 progressed, and the relationship between the 
West and Russia reached new depths, the MFA seemingly felt 
the need to state more often that although beneficial for both 
parties, the the Sino-Russian relationship is a “non-alliance” (
不结盟), that is not directed against any third party.12 Simi-
larly, any notion that the bilateral relations might develop 
into something akin of an Eastern NATO (东方北约) was 
vehemently denied, reiterating how China is opposed to the 
old concepts of military alliances and power blocs.13 A recent 
Global Times editorial from mid-December also reflects a con-
siderable change in tone regarding Chinese support to Russia, 
2 Pew Research Center, Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project: 
Russia’s Global Image Negative amid Crisis in Ukraine, July 9, 2014, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/09/russias-global-image-nega-
tive-amid-crisis-in-ukraine/.
3 MFA of the PRC, “Xi Jinping Meets with President Vladimir Putin of 
Russia - Statements,” November 9, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/topics_665678/ytjhzzdrsrcldrfzshyjxghd/t1209538.shtml.
4 MFA of the PRC, “Xi Jinping Meets with President Vladimir Putin of 
Russia - Statements,” July 29, 2014, http://za.china-embassy.org/
eng/zgxw/t1178741.htm.
5  Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the 
US Pacific Pivot,” China Leadership Monitor 38 (2012): 1–26.
6 Sheng Zhong, “邻居朋友来贺喜 中俄更浓人情味 (Friendly Neigh-
bours, China and Russia Growing Even Closer),” People’s Daily 
(Chinese Edition), February 10, 2014, http://opinion.people.com.
cn/n/2014/0210/c1003-24306706.html.
7 Xinhua, “李克强会见俄罗斯总理梅德韦杰夫 (Li Keqiang Meets With 
Russian Prime Minister Medvedyev),” December 15, 2014, http://
politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1215/c1024-26210771.html.
8 MFA of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s 
Regular Press Conference on September 15, 2014,” September 
15, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1191291.shtml.
9 Global Times Editorial, “US Actions Make China-Russia Alliance Ap-
pealing,” Global Times, January 20, 2012, http://www.globaltimes.
cn/content/692969.shtml.
10 Global Times Editorial, “Backing Russia Is in China’s Interests,” 
Global Times, March 5, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/846263.shtml.
11 MFA of the PRC, “2014年5月21日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行记者会 
(Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference, 
May 21, 2014),” May 21, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/
fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1158169.shtml.
12 MFA of the PRC, “2014年7月2日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行记者会 
(Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference, 
July 2, 2014),” July 2, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/
fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1170767.shtml.
13 MFA of the PRC, “2014年11月27日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记
者会 (Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Chung Ying’s Regular Press Con-
ference, November 27, 2014),” November 27, 2014, http://www.fm-
prc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1215033.shtml.
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even from the newspaper traditionally reflecting the more 
hawkish side of the Chinese political elite. Pointing out that 
China does not want Russia to collapse, it does however take 
care to emphasize that “[a]lthough it has the capability to offer 
help to Russia at critical moments, China does not have to act 
in a proactive manner. (…) With many uncertainties, China also 
faces challenges about how to lead its relationship with Russia 
to a reciprocal end.”14
Conclusions and Recommendations
– The Chinese view of the Russian ‘Go East’ strategy’s politi-
cal dimensions, may be summed up as a strategy of com-
bining limited assertiveness with reassurance. Recognizing 
the urgency of Russia’s turn East as a result of the country’s 
soured relationship with the West, China seems conscious 
to avoid engender opportunities for themselves to end in 
a similar situation. It is important to note the signs of an 
internal debate going on. However, it is equally important 
to consider that the more radical the support for Russia, the 
more peripheral and less authoritative is the publication. 
– Regarding the prospects of Sino-Russian economic coop-
eration, on the other hand, the political leadership has 
expressed warm support, particularly about the prospects 
of cooperation in developing infrastructure and energy 
extraction in the region. This aspect of Russia’s ‘Go East’ 
strategy is regarded as dovetailing with the Chinese strat-
egy of developing stronger economic links westwards.
– The Chinese relationship with Russia may be regarded as 
pragmatically oriented, a means to secure China’s strategic 
depth and exploit Moscow’s strained relationship to the rest 
of the world to their own advantage. However, in sharing a 
range of concerns about the nature of current international 
relations, Sino-Russian relations also share the potential for 
a deeper engagement. One of the main common themes of 
Chinese and Russian domestic foreign policy debates is the 
fear of being surrounded and hemmed in, by the US and its 
European allies for Russia in the West, and by the US and its 
Asian allies for China in the East. It should be regarded as 
pivotal not to stoke Sino-Russian fears of a shared destiny 
of Western powers surrounding the Eurasian heartland, by 
ensuring and communicating that sanctions and political 
repercussions towards Russia are kept separate from the 
West’s policies as they pivot to the Asia Pacific. Western 
nations should do their best to avoid providing the raison 
d’être for a potential Sino-Russian alliance, but instead seek 
to shore up the pre-eminent economic and political impor-
tance of the West for China.
– China is walking a fine political line between the West and 
Russia, while simultaneously seeking to define their iden-
tity as a world power. This dynamic is deserving of far closer 
study than what has to date been allotted to the subject. 
Recent history has demonstrated to us both the volatility 
of Sino-Russian relations, the relationship’s importance for 
the wider regional and global political development, and 
the Western penchant for letting too shallow a knowledge of 
Chinese policy debates result in unexpected changes in the 
Sino-Russian relationship. More research on the topic would 
benefit not only the regional great powers, but also Norway, 
which economic interests in the region have been growing at 
a rapid pace over the last decade.
14 Global Times Editorial, “China Needs Clear Strategy to Help 
Russia,” December 17, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/897151.shtml.
